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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Municipal bonds corresponding to states that passed effective post-Kelo 
restrictions on eminent domain takings experienced an increase in yields. The high costs 
associated with property acquisitions in states with strong legislation deter economic 
development takings and contribute to the decreasing of municipal bond prices.  The 
financial effect attributed to municipal bonds issued for the purpose of economic 
improvement completely exceeds the impact offered by industrial improvement and 
public improvement bonds.  The Kelo decision itself reinforced the appropriateness of 
government takings for private gain.  The outcome directly affected municipal bond 
yields, causing an increase in price because of the low cost involved with property 
seizures.   A sample of 4403 municipal bonds, two legislation classification systems, and 
bond exposure in 42 of the 50 states ensures robustness in the analysis.  The importance 
of an efficient amount of government intervention is critical to the health of society.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
According to the Fifth Amendment, an individual may not “be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”  The purpose of the takings clause in the Fifth 
Amendment is to restrict how far and by what means a government entity can exercise its 
right to seize private property for public use.  The public right to seize property is known 
as eminent domain. Eminent domain is formally defined as the power of the state to seize 
a citizen's private property, expropriate property, or rights in property for public use, 
without the owner's consent1.  The evolution of the interpretation of “public use” has 
changed over time and represented the most contentious disagreements over its use.  The 
once narrow definition of “public use”, included takings that directly benefit the 
community such as highways, municipal buildings, and airports, has been transformed 
into an extensive understanding of the term which encompasses any takings that will 
increase social welfare.  This transition is mirrored in the outcome of the controversial 
Supreme Court case, Kelo v. City of New London2.   
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 
During the late 1990’s, the city of New London, Connecticut experienced slow 
economic growth and generated revenue less than the amount needed to cover costs.  In 
order to stimulate the deteriorating economy and promote growth, the city initiated a 
                                                 
1
 USLaw.com, http://www.uslaw.com/us_law_dictionary/e/Eminent+Domain 
2
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) 
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revival plan under the guidance of the New London Development Corporation (NLDC).  
The NLDC served as a private, non-profit intermediary between the city’s interest and the 
public view.  The NLDC was in charge of holding public hearings, acquiring property, 
and redistributing the seized private property to the most valued users.  Part of the revival 
initiative included enticing Pfizer Corporation to locate its new research institution on the 
Thames River.  To make the area more attractive and induce Pfizer Corporation to invest 
capital in New London, the NLDC proposed redeveloping an adjacent tract of land.  The 
projected area, Fort Trumbull would serve as a better complement to the neighboring 
research facility if it were redeveloped.   
After Pfizer’s investment commitment, the NLDC fulfilled its promise by 
disclosing the redevelopment plan to the public.  The plan consisted of transforming the 
predominately middle to low income Fort Trumbull area, into a more modern facade 
including a luxury hotel, conference center, upscale residential and commercial 
properties, and a state park.  The NLDC negotiated fair market acquisitions of all the 
properties except 15 residential tracts owned by 9 individuals.  The NLDC was given the 
license to obtain the reluctant property owner’s land by means of the city’s eminent 
domain authority.   
The lead plaintiff in the Kelo v. City of New London case, Susette Kelo, believed 
the seizure of her and her neighbor’s properties violated the Takings Clause in the Fifth 
Amendment.  According to Kelo, the city’s actions unjustly expanded the intended 
meaning of “public use”.  The stubborn property owners argued their case against the city 
of New London at the state level in the Supreme Court of Connecticut.  Kelo and the 
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other plaintiffs contended that the city circumvented the law to transfer property from 
private owners in Fort Trumbull to a private entity (NLDC), which was inconsistent with 
the original intent of the Takings Clause.  The Supreme Court of Connecticut favored 
New London by offering the statement, “an economic development plan that the 
appropriate legislative authority rationally has determined will promote significant 
municipal economic development constitutes a valid public use for the exercise of the 
eminent domain power.”3   
After pressure from the Institute for Justice on behalf of Kelo, the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the extent of limitations of the Fifth 
Amendment pertaining to private takings by municipalities for economic development.  
The Kelo petition, presented by the Institute for Justice, offers 3 supporting arguments, 
(I) The condemnation of petitioners’ homes for the sole purpose of economic 
development violates the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment, (II) Even if 
this court holds that eminent domain for economic development is not categorically 
unconstitutional, these particular condemnations still do not constitute a public use, (III) 
The sky will not fall if this court rules in favor of petitioners, while a ruling affirming the 
Connecticut Supreme Court will open the flood gates4.  Advocates of private property 
protection hoped the high court’s decision to hear the case would place some meaningful 
restrictions on eminent domain takings.  The Kelo case was the first major eminent 
domain trial to be heard at the Supreme Court level since the Hawaii Housing Authority 
                                                 
3
 Kelo v. New London, 843 A. 2d 500, 528 (Conn. 2004). 
4
 Brief of Petitioners, On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, No. 04-108 
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v. Midkiff5 case in 1984, which had greatly expanded the eminent domain authority and 
the definition of public use to include public benefit.   
The Kelo case was argued on February 22, 2005 in front of only 7 of the 9 
Supreme Court justices.  4 months later, the U.S. Supreme Court offered a 5-4 decision 
supporting the actions of New London.  The majority opinion was endorsed by Justice 
John P. Stevens, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen 
Breyer.  The majority opinion was based on prior precedent established by cases such as 
Berman v. Parker6 and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.   
The Berman case entailed a redevelopment plan targeting a blighted portion of 
Washington, D.C.  Within the projected area, a local department store owner disputed the 
condemnation, stating that his store was not described as blighted.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court refused to assess the specific claim of the plaintiff, deferring the decision to a more 
extensive ruling on the redevelopment plan in the entirety.  The broad interpretation of 
the “public use” term in the Takings Clause was explicitly accepted by an undivided 
court: 
“We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not 
desirable.  The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive…  The values 
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.  It is 
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be 
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as 
carefully patrolled.  In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies 
have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values.  It is not 
for us to reappraise them.  If those who govern the District of Columbia decide 
                                                 
5
 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
6
 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) 
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that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing 
in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way”7 
 
The outcome of the infamous Berman case restructured the definition of the “public use” 
clause to include “public purpose”.  The expanded meaning of “public use” derived from 
the Berman case served as a legal landmark for future cases pertaining to eminent domain 
such as Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff and Kelo v. City of New London. 
 In 1984, the Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff case was brought before the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  In light of highly concentrated ownership on the island of Oahu, 
the Hawaii Housing Authority used eminent domain to redistribute land ownership.  The 
reallocation would prevent oligopoly land ownership, maintain land prices, and promote 
public welfare.  For public policy reasons, the Hawaii Housing Authority forced the sale 
of leased lands to ensure a more equitable division of property.  The principle land 
owners were forced to relinquish their property to long-term lessees at fair market value.  
The plaintiff, Midkiff, argued that the entire burden of the Land Reform Act (1967) was 
incurred by the rightful property owners.  In a unanimous ruling, the Supreme Court 
supported the Hawaii Housing Authority.  The decision was based on the state’s 
inalienable right to utilize policing power to ensure markets operate efficiently.  The 
justices declared the land did not have to be put to a “public use” in order to qualify for 
eminent domain use.  The determination implies judicial deference to the Hawaii 
Housing Authority or any acting legislature.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concluded: 
“In our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public 
purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the taking power… Thus, if a 
                                                 
7
 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) Id., at 33 
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legislature, state or federal, determines there are substantial reasons for an 
exercise of the taking power, courts must defer to its determination that the taking 
will serve a public use.”8 
The ruling in favor of the Hawaii Housing Authority reaffirmed the Berman decision.   
 Based on the strength of the established precedent, Kelo’s negative outcome for 
the private property owners was anticipated.   The majority opinion, written by Justice 
Stevens emphasized the importance of the long standing precedent, which served as the 
main contributor to the final decision.  Although the concurring judges were adamant 
about their decision, they acknowledged the suffering induced by eminent domain 
takings.  Justice Stevens also embraced the idea of individual states enacting legislation 
to further protect citizens from eminent domain exploitation: “We emphasize that nothing 
in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the 
taking power.”9   
 The dissenting opinion, written by Justice O’Connor demonstrated 
disbelief of the majority opinion’s conclusion.  She presented evidence on the failure of 
the Supreme Court in determining explicit limitations on how far municipal takings can 
extend.  This failure to establish limits makes all private property subject to “being taken 
and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded.”10  She also 
states, “Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now 
vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be 
                                                 
8
 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) Id. at 244. 
9
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) Id. 
10
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) Id. At 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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upgraded-i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more 
beneficial to the public-in the process.”11  
O’Connor explained the differences between the Kelo case and Berman and 
Midkiff cases.  The Berman and Midkiff takings were consistent with the “Public Use 
Clause” because “the extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property 
inflicted affirmative harm on society-in Berman through blight resulting from extreme 
poverty and in Midkiff through oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth.”12  In both 
cases, the takings were deemed constitutional because the legislative entity mitigated 
harm by removing or redistributing property use.13  The takings performed by the 
legislative body in Berman and Midkiff were considered a direct public benefit even 
though the transfer was private-to-private.   
On the other hand, the property acquired through means of eminent domain in 
New London was not blighted.  The homes of Susette Kelo and Wilhelmina Dery were 
well-maintained and generated no social harm.14  O’Connor states, after Kelo nothing “is 
to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a 
shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”15  The premise of the dissenting opinion 
explains how the majority decision moves way from “harmful property use” 
condemnation conclusions in Berman and Midkiff to a more extensive meaning of public 
use.  O’Connor’s opinion states, “It holds that the sovereign may take private property 
currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so 
                                                 
11
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) Id. At 494 
12
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) Id. At 2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
13
 Berman, supra, at 28-29, 75 S. Ct. 98; Midkiff, supra, at 232, 104 S. Ct. 2321 
14
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) Id. At 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
15
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) Id. At 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public-such as 
increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even esthetic pleasure.”16  According to this 
statement, the “public use” clause can be applied to any circumstance where benefit is 
received by transfer of property, rendering it useless.  Eminent domain is not constrained 
by the new precedent established by the Kelo decision.   
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO KELO: 
In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens encouraged states to provide further 
legislative limitations on takings allowed by municipalities.  The political conflict 
induced by the Kelo decision and the call by Stevens to legislate has 43 states enacting 
some type of post-Kelo legislative reform.17  Table 1.1 provides the dates that states 
adopted eminent domain reforms after Kelo. (As of February 16, 2009) 
Table 1.1: State Legislative Action Post-Kelo: 
States: Legislation Type: Signed Law Date:  Voter Approved: 
Alabama SB 68 
HB 654 
08/03/2005 
04/25/2006 
 
Alaska HB 318 07/05/2006  
Arizona Proposition 207 11/07/2006  
California SB 53 
SB 1206 
SB 1210 
SB 1650 
SB 1809 
09/29/2006 
09/29/2006 
09/29/2006 
09/29/2006 
09/29/2006 
 
Colorado HB 1411 06/06/2006  
Connecticut SB 167 06/25/2007  
Delaware SB 217 07/21/2005  
Florida HB 1567 
HJR 1569 
05/11/2006 
05/04/2006 
 
11/07/2006 
Georgia HB 1306 04/04/2006  
                                                 
16
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) Id. At 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 
17
 http://www.castlecoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=510 (visited Feb. 16, 
2009) 
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HB 1313 04/04/2006 11/07/2006 
Idaho HB 555 03/21/2006  
Illinois SB 3086 07/28/2006  
Indiana HB 1010 03/24/2006  
Iowa HF 2351 07/14/2351  
Kansas SB 323 05/18/2006  
Kentucky HB 508 03/28/2006  
Louisiana HB 707 
SB 1 
06/19/2006 
05/31/2006 
09/30/2006 
09/30/2006 
Maine LB 1870 04/13/2006  
Maryland SB 3 05/08/2007  
Michigan SJR E 12/13/2005 11/07/2006 
Minnesota SF 2750 05/19/2006  
Missouri HB 1944 07/13/2006  
Montana SB 41 
SB 363 
05/08/2007 
05/16/2007 
 
Nebraska LB 924 04/13/2006  
Nevada AB 102 05/23/2007  
New Hampshire SB 287 
CACR 30 
06/23/2006 
04/20/2006 
 
11/07/2006 
New Mexico HB 393 
SB 401 
04/03/2007 
04/03/2007 
 
North Carolina HB 1965 08/10/2006  
North Dakota Measure 2 
SB 2214 
11/07/2006 
04/05/2007 
 
Ohio SB 167 
SB 7 
11/16/2005 
07/10/2007 
 
Oregon Measure 39 11/07/2006  
Pennsylvania HB 2054 
SB 881 
05/04/2006 
05/04/2006 
 
Rhode Island S2728A 07/02/2008  
South Carolina SB 1031 06/14/2006 11/07/2006 
South Dakota HB 1080 03/17/2006  
Tennessee HB 3450 
SB 3296 
HB 3700 
06/05/2006 
06/05/2006 
06/27/2006 
 
Texas SB 7 09/01/2005  
Utah SB 117 
HB 365 
03/21/2006 
03/20/2006 
 
Vermont S 246 04/14/2006  
Virginia HB 2954 
SB 781 
SB 1296 
04/04/2007 
04/04/2007 
04/04/2007 
 
Washington HB 1458 04/04/2007  
 10
West Virginia HB 4048 04/05/2006  
Wisconsin AB 657 03/30/2006  
Wyoming HB 124 02/28/2007  
Source: Castle Coalition: Enacted Legislation since Kelo: 
http://www.castlecoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=510 
 
 
Some states have followed through with the Justice Stevens’ request to supplement state 
law by means of narrowing the definition of blight to encompass areas that only threaten 
public health and safety or abolishing eminent domain use for blight.  Other states 
enacted insignificant post-Kelo reform for reasons such as negotiations, haste, or political 
pressure from lobbyists, lawyers, developers, and real estate agents.  The residual states 
not falling into any of the two previous categories, elected to falter and not pass any form 
of legislature.  In the time after Kelo, state eminent domain reform has been intensely 
evaluated by lawyers, economists, and other scholars.  To capture alternative 
interpretations of these laws in the analysis, two classification methods are employed.  
The classification systems will be explained in more detail in Chapter 2. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUNI YIELDS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 
Municipal bonds are issued by states or municipalities to generate revenue for 
numerous public projects.  Bond traders who price municipal bonds are interested in two 
determinants, future tax expectations and non-revenue factors.  Future tax expectations of 
municipalities play an essential role in the determination of municipal bond prices.  Tax 
capacity is determined by multiplying the market value of each property within the city 
by the tax rate for the use of the property.  The tax rate is the fee required from each 
property to collect the amount of dollars needed to operate public systems.  If a 
municipality has a large tax capacity, they will be able to meet their debt obligations.  
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The smaller the city’s tax capacity, the higher the default premium and the less likely to 
meet financial needs.  Future tax expectations will not be explored in this study. 
The other determinant of municipal bond prices and yields is non-revenue factors 
such as state legislation and other market conditions.  A public policy such effective 
restrictions on eminent domain takings by municipalities contribute to the pricing of the 
municipal bond.  This analysis will look at the pricing of municipal bonds in relationship 
to the consequences induced by Kelo and the state legislation passed thereafter.  If a state 
passed effective post-Kelo reform, yields are predicted to rise because the cost incurred in 
the takings will rise significantly.  If a state passes ineffective restrictions on eminent 
domain takings, the yields on municipal bonds within the state will decrease or not be 
affected.   
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE: 
 The fundamental objective of this analysis is to better understand legislative 
eminent domain reforms induced by Kelo.  It also attempts to decipher the many and 
complex motives pushing states to pass different degrees of meaningful reform.  An 
extensive background investigation of the evolution of private property rights throughout 
the years in the United States will provide a sound foundation for a concentrated study on 
economic development takings.  
  Previous literature pertaining to the post-Kelo reaction is examined and utilized 
to supplement the study.  Municipal bonds issued for the purpose of economic 
improvement, public improvement, and industrial improvement will be analyzed to 
determine the relationship between current bid yields and the effectiveness of post-Kelo 
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reform at the state level.  Examples of each type of municipal bond purpose will be 
provided.   
 The municipal bond yields for states that passed effective post-Kelo reform are 
expected to rise between the measurement dates because of the high cost involved in the 
acquisition of private property.  The increased protection of property rights will drive the 
price of the bond down and inversely cause the yield to go up.  The municipal bond 
yields for states that passed ineffective post-Kelo reform are projected to fall because the 
difficulty to seize property is very low.  The minimal cost to acquire land under 
ineffective reform inflates the price of the bond causing the yield to decrease.  The yield 
analysis will add value to the importance of effective eminent domain legislation and 
provide further insight on the consequences provoked by Kelo.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
CLASSIFICATION METHODS: 
The Castle Coalition, a national grassroots property rights activism project 
initiated by the Institute for Justice, developed a classification system to evaluate the 
effectiveness of post-Kelo legislation on a state-by-state basis.  The “50 State Report 
Card”18 published in June 2007, assigns each state a letter grade based on the quality of 
their reform.  Each state’s legislation is appraised on the pivotal question, “How hard is it 
now for the government to take a person’s home or business and give it to someone else 
for private gain?”19  States that made it more difficult to condemn property receive A’s 
and B’s on the ordinal scale.  States responding with relatively simple conditions receive 
a grade of C or D.  States receiving F’s failed to pass any post-Kelo reform.   
5 states were classified as passing grade “A-“and above forms of legislation 
(Florida, Michigan, New Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota).  16 states passed 
post-Kelo reform worthy of receiving a grade of “B-“to “B+” (Alabama, Arizona, 
Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming).  6 states passed 
law reforms classified as “C” range material (Colorado, North Carolina, Texas, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).  15 states received a “D” rating for enacting 
law with limited strength (Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, 
                                                 
18
 Castle Coalition, www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf 
19
 Castle Coalition, www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf, pg. 4 
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Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Tennessee, and 
Vermont).  The remaining 8 states were assigned “F” grades for not enacting any type of 
post-Kelo reform (Arkansas, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New 
York, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island).  There is no regional pattern present when 
allocating the state’s grades.  The time elapsed from Kelo until each state’s legislation 
has no relevant effect on the classification.   
 Ilya Somin’s paper, “The Limits of Backlash:  Assessing the Political Response 
to Kelo,” develops a classification system categorizing three types of legislature.  
Somin’s method is the most current source to date (January 2008), including any new 
state amendments after the Castle Coalition’s “50 State Report Card” in June 2007.   
State legislative reform is deemed “Effective” if it “provides property owners with at 
least some significant protection against economic development condemnations beyond 
that available under preexisting law.”20  Also included within the limits of “effective” 
reform are laws that mitigate the probability of economic development takings even 
though they may not completely prohibit takings.  Post-Kelo reform is considered 
“ineffective” if “they forbid economic development condemnations but essentially allow 
them to continue under another name, as in the case of states with broad definitions of 
“blight” that allow virtually any property to be declared blighted and condemned.”21  The 
last category, “no reform” includes all states that failed to alter their existing eminent 
domain law.   
                                                 
20
 Ilya Somin, “The Limits of Backlash:  Assessing the Political Response to Kelo”, pg. 11 
21
 Ilya Somin, “The Limits of Backlash:  Assessing the Political Response to Kelo”, pg. 12 
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According to Somin, 19 states are classified as passing effective legislation 
(Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming).  The remaining 30 states 
excluding Utah (Passed legislation before Kelo) passed ineffective legislation (Alaska, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).  The state of 
Utah passed effective legislation before the Kelo decision was offered.  Utah will be 
included as a “1” in the analysis.  The regional spatial distribution of states based on 
strength of legislation is relatively equal.  No one specific region has a dominant share of 
states passing effective or ineffective post-Kelo legislation.   
For the purposes of this paper, grades A+ to B- assigned by the Castle Coalition 
are coded as “1”, and grades C+ to F- are coded as “0”.  Somin’s classification as 
“effective” will be assigned “1”.  Somin’s classification as “ineffective” or “no reform” 
will be coded “0”.    Table 2.1 illustrates the Castle Coalition’s sorting method and Ilya 
Somin’s classification system.   
Table 2.1: State Classification Methods22 
State: Castle Coalition 
Classification: 
CC Variable 
Coding: 
Somin’s  
Classification: 
S Variable 
Coding: 
Alabama      B+ 1 Effective 1 
Alaska D 0 Ineffective 0 
                                                 
22
 Ilya Somin, “The Limits of Backlash:  Assessing the Political Response to Kelo”, pg. 14-15; Castle 
Coalition, www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf , synopsis 
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Arizona      B+ 1 Effective 1 
Arkansas F 0 No Reform 0 
California      D- 0 Ineffective 0 
Colorado C 0 Ineffective 0 
Connecticut D 0 Ineffective 0 
Delaware      D- 0 Ineffective 0 
Florida A 1 Effective 1 
Georgia      B+ 1 Effective 1 
Hawaii F 0 No Reform 0 
Idaho      D+ 0 Effective 1 
Illinois      D+ 0 Ineffective 0 
Indiana B 1 Effective 1 
Iowa      B- 1 Ineffective 0 
Kansas      B+ 1 Effective 1 
Kentucky      D+ 0 Ineffective 0 
Louisiana B 1 Effective 1 
Maine      D+ 0 Ineffective 0 
Maryland D 0 Ineffective 0 
Massachusetts F 0 No Reform 0 
Michigan      A- 1 Effective 1 
Minnesota      B- 1 Effective 1 
Mississippi F 0 No Reform 0 
Missouri D 0 Ineffective 0 
Montana D 0 Ineffective 0 
Nebraska      D+ 0 Ineffective 0 
Nevada      B+ 1 Effective 1 
New Hampshire      B+ 1 Effective 1 
New Jersey F 0 No Reform 0 
New Mexico      A- 1 Effective 1 
New York F 0 No Reform 0 
North Carolina      C- 0 Ineffective 0 
North Dakota A 1 Effective 1 
Ohio D 0 Ineffective 0 
Oklahoma F 0 No Reform 0 
Oregon      B+ 1 Effective 1 
Pennsylvania      B- 1 Effective 1 
Rhode Island F 0 Ineffective 0 
South Carolina      B+ 1 Ineffective 0 
South Dakota A 1 Effective 1 
Tennessee      D- 0 Ineffective 0 
Texas      C- 0 Ineffective 0 
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Utah B 1 Enacted Prior Kelo N/A 
Vermont      D- 0 Ineffective 0 
Virginia      B+ 1 Effective 1 
Washington      C- 0 No Reform 0 
West Virginia      C- 0 Ineffective 0 
Wisconsin      C+ 0 Ineffective 0 
Wyoming B 1 Effective 1 
 
    
Source: Ilya Somin, “The Limits of Backlash:  Assessing the Political Response to Kelo”, pg. 14-15; Castle 
Coalition, www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf , synopsis 
 
The only discrepancies apparent in the two classification systems are three states, Idaho, 
Iowa, and South Carolina.  Even though Utah’s legislation is pre-Kelo, it is included in 
both tests coded as “1”.  The Castle Coalition awards the state of Idaho with a D+ grade 
because the state’s definition of “public use” is very weak.  House Bill 555 leaves room 
for broad interpretation of public use and fails to prohibit strategic maneuvering of parties 
interested in economic development takings.  Somin classifies Idaho’s post-Kelo reform 
as effective, bolstering his opinion by stating Idaho’s law “couples a ban on economic 
development condemnations with restrictions on the definition of blight, roughly 
speaking, restrict blight condemnations to areas that fit the intuitive layperson’s definition 
of the term.”23   
 The Castle Coalition confers the state of Iowa a B- grade, explaining how the 
significant improvement from the existing eminent domain law further protects the rights 
of individual property owners.  House File 2351 ensures a fair assessment of each piece 
of property within the potential acquisition, requiring 75% of the individual tracts be 
blighted for an entire purchase.  Somin asserts, Iowa’s statute still allows prospective 
                                                 
23
 Ilya Somin, “The Limits of Backlash:  Assessing the Political Response to Kelo”, pg. 35 
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economic developers to evade restrictions and continue participating in takings.  Somin 
explains the extensive definition of blight in HF 2351 depends on “the definition of such 
terms as “deterioration” and “excessive and uncorrected deterioration of site”.”24  He 
classifies Iowa’s reform as ineffective.  The divergence in opinions between the Castle 
Coalition and Somin comes down to the interpretation of the definition of blight.   
 The last departure of judgment rests in the decision over South Carolina’s post-
Kelo legislation.  The Castle Coalition grants South Carolina with a grade of B+, stating 
the “constitutional amendment declares that blighted property must be a danger to public 
health and safety, effectively eliminating bogus blight.”   Ilya Somin classifies South 
Carolina as promoting ineffective legislature after the Kelo decision.  South Carolina was 
1 of 10 states passing reform by means of popular referendum.  Even though the realized 
outcome was initiated by popular referendum, the result was not sufficient for an 
effective classification according to Somin.  He argues, “the new constitutional 
amendment adds nothing to the case law and leaves open the possibility that future court 
decisions will be able to reverse it in the absence of a clear textual statement in the state 
constitution to the contrary.”25 
 Figure 2.1 shows the state classification system created by the Castle Coalition 
and Ilya Somin.  The states with a dark grey background are considered to have passed 
effective legislation and states with a white background are classified as ineffective.  The 
states with light grey shaded areas are the differences in the two classification methods 
employed in this study. 
                                                 
24
 Ilya Somin, “The Limits of Backlash:  Assessing the Political Response to Kelo”, pg. 26 
25
 Ilya Somin, “The Limits of Backlash:  Assessing the Political Response to Kelo”, pg. 39-40 
  Figure 2.1:  State Classification Allocation
Although both ordering techniques deviate
majority of the classifications are consistent.  
systems offer substantial evidence supporting their claims
reform 
THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE PROPE
 Property, public or private is formally defined as any “article, item, or thing 
owned with the rights of possession, use, and enjoyment, and which the owner can 
bestow, collateralize, encumber, mortgage, sell, or transfer, and can exclude everyone 
else from it.”26  From the earliest known civilizations, private property is characterized by 
few contractual agreements and 
nomadic lifestyle to settlement dwelling, created by agriculture, led to 
private property.  The sense of ownership and the potential profit generated by land 
possession founded the initial 
                                                
26
 BusinessDictionary.com, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/property.html
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 away from each other on three occasions, the 
Both the Castle Coalition and Somin
 for each state’s post
TY: 
limited use of specific boundaries.  The transition from a 
the development of 
phenomenon of property rights in the United States
 
 
 
’s 
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The essential principle at the axis of modern law explains how “property is the 
guardian of every other right”27  According to Richard Epstein28, “Our founding fathers 
had a keen appreciation of the central role of private property in social life, which is why 
they included the takings clause in the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”29  The suppression of the Fifth Amendment and the apathy demonstrated 
by the United States Supreme Court during the New Deal era, allowed unrestricted 
government access to property needed to accomplish economic development and foster 
increased social welfare.  The relevant neglect is present in the outcome of the Berman 
and Midkiff cases.  Not until the Kelo case in 2005, has the public been fully aware of the 
danger imposed by the power of eminent domain and economic development takings. 
“TAKINGS” AND THE STATE: 
 Epstein’s book, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain30, 
explores nearly every facet of the policing power exhibited by the state in relationship to 
eminent domain and government takings.  At the outset, Epstein establishes the 
importance of efficient government control by using the following pie charts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Richard A. Epstein, Supreme Neglect, pg. 1 
28
 Richard A. Epstein, James Parker Hall Professor of Law, University of Chicago 
29
 Richard A. Epstein, Supreme Neglect, pg. 2 
30
 Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1985 
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Figure 2.2:  Ineffective/Effective State Control 
 
The ineffective state control chart refers to an area where government intervention is at a 
minimum.  Individual property owners, a thru f, have diminishing incentives to maximize 
their potential earnings by fully utilizing their endowment.  If private property rights are 
not well established and reinforced by a strong central government, owners are hesitant to 
make necessary investments due to others threatening to take advantage of their hard 
work.  In a political system with explicit and enforceable property rights, society can reap 
gains represented by the effective state control chart.  The effective state control chart 
displays the external band surrounding the initial distribution of land with ineffective 
state control.  Each property owner gains an additional amount of surplus a’ thru f’ from 
efficient government intervention.  The government entity’s primary purpose is to ensure 
society moves from the small pie chart to the chart including the external net benefit to 
society.   
Epstein points out two present inefficiencies in the system of private property 
rights, “inability to control private aggression… and voluntary transactions cannot 
a
b
c
d
e
f
Ineffective State Control:
a'
b'
c'
d'
e'
f'
Effective State Control
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generate the centralized power needed to combat private aggression.”31  The 
government’s answer to the existing failures, eminent domain use, mitigates free-rider 
issues, transaction costs, and holdouts by sellers.  Epstein asserts government intervention 
is only necessary when confronted by “problems of aggression and provision of public 
goods.”32  Although the state may address market failure problems, it should be 
constrained by the function it provides.   
The fundamental need for civil governance and the powers obtained by political 
entities results from the citizens presided over in society.  Without the interaction of 
individuals and the self-interested forces provoking takings, the need for protection of 
property rights would be non-existent.  Epstein declares, “Representative government 
begins with the premise that the state’s rights against its citizens are no greater than the 
sum of the rights of the individuals whom it benefits in any given transaction.”33  The 
government’s sole objective is to exploit all possible gains for society.  The authority of 
eminent domain should only be utilized when a citizen’s utility could be increased in 
comparison to their value before the transfer of property.  The price received for the 
relinquishing of private property should meet or exceed the opportunity cost of giving up 
the possession.  The takings clause in the Fifth Amendment states, “… nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”  
The emotions and physiological attachment accompanying ownership of a domain 
significantly contributes to the intangible value appraised by the title-holder.  The true 
                                                 
31
 Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1985, pg. 5 
32
 Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1985, pg. 5 
33
 Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1985, pg. 331 
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value placed on the entitlement of a tract of land and dwelling residing within, 
completely exceeds the deemed worth assessed by a third party.  The divergence in actual 
value observed by two evaluators prompts a controversial question, “How can any 
individual property owner be truly compensated for being displaced from a place they 
call home?”   
According to Epstein, the most optimal compensation would “leave the individual 
owner in a position of indifference between the taking by the government and retention of 
the property.”34  Another approach to “just compensation” is allow the market to 
determine a price through bargaining between the seller and the buyer.  The relevant 
failure with this system lies at the foundation of modern game theory. Presume the seller 
places a value of β on their property and the buyer is willing to purchase the property for 
α.  This is a game of asymmetric information where the valuation of both opposing sides 
is unknown.  If the buyer is willing to accept the seller’s offer, β, then the seller is 
hesitant to sell because he has incentive to holdout for a higher payoff.  The outcome 
resulting in this game is inefficient due to the non-agreement realized.  Overall the central 
theme regarding compensation for takings is extremely convoluted and fragile.   
PUBLIC USE: 
 The judicial result of the Berman and Midkiff cases expanded the public use term 
within the eminent domain clause to include any taking for public purpose or general 
social advancement.    Based on the precedent established before Kelo, Bruce Ackerman 
pronounces “any state purpose otherwise constitutional should qualify as sufficiently 
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 Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1985, pg. 182 
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‘public’ to justify a taking.”35  When evaluating the public use doctrine, Epstein asks the 
question, “Who gets the surplus?”  For example36, let’s say there are 25 people in the 
society and 1 central presiding body.  If the government seizes a citizens’ private 
property for building a community center and realizes an increase in gross surplus of 
1000 utils, who receives the surplus and how is it distributed?  Firstly, the citizen whose 
land was acquired needs to be justly compensated (200 utils).  Then, the cost of 
procurement and operation of the state needs to be satisfied (300 utils).  The net surplus 
received by the society is 500 utils.  In order for the state to remain in good standing and 
act for the benefit of society, the residual utility should be allocated by imposing 
symmetry.  Each person in society should receive on average 20 utils of the remaining 
surplus for their contribution to the state.  Now let’s assume the transfer of private 
property by use of eminent domain goes to a real estate developer, such as the NLDC.  
Holding all other constraints ceteris paribus, how does the allocation of surplus differ 
from the initial scenario?  Well, the gross surplus of 1000 utils will directly go to the real 
estate developer.  After the former owner of property is compensated, the net surplus of 
600 utils is enjoyed by the private development corporation.   
 The previous example enlightens the astounding disparity between the definitions 
of public use and public purpose.  A true public use definition is consistent with the 
situation where surplus is shared by society.  Interpreting public use as public purpose 
allows for transfers of private property within the community to private firms with 
                                                 
35
 Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (1977) 
36
 The example is a variation of one of Richard Epstein’s illustrations in Takings 
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intentions of profit maximization.  The wealth gain realized through a private-to-private 
transaction is not enjoyed by citizens of the society.   
GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES: 
The relevant question at hand is why does the state not regulate against private-to-
private transfers of property, knowing the detrimental public effects ensued? The 
incentives of the government are not aligned with the total wellbeing of its citizens if the 
distribution of additional surplus is not properly allocated.  The objective function of the 
state is to provide adequate protection of its citizen’s rights and operate solely for the 
purpose of optimizing the welfare of society.  Government revenue is generated by means 
of fiscal policy and payment from citizens for illegal infractions.  The income earned by 
these two forms should be for the purpose of maintaining the sustainability of the state.  
Any returns exceeding necessary costs should be redistributed evenly among the 
contributing citizens.  What factors encourage government entities to operate like a 
corporation and strive to maximize profit regardless of the cost?  
The answer to the previous question is quite obvious; it all comes down to money, 
population density, and power.  A significant government deficit could be a potential 
reason for the takings of private property by eminent domain.  A state confronted with 
expenses surpassing the capital inflow is inclined to operate in a dishonest manner to 
maintain political power.  Population density also brings up the issue of holdout.  Holdout 
is more likely when the number of people per acre increases.  The state would be inclined 
to abuse eminent domain when population patterns are quite dense.  It is not a surprise 
that the state of New York has not passed any reform post-Kelo.  Power in the wrong 
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political hands can present a serious problem to the welfare of the state.  Corruption 
within governing bodies is always an influencing factor for unconstitutional acts, when 
the potential for capital gain is relevant.  Private monetary kickbacks from real estate 
developers and corporations also entice political officials to engage in unjust takings.    
The governing body of the city of New London supported the takings in the Fort 
Trumbull area by explaining how much public benefit would rise due to an increase in 
the tax base.  The proposed economic development plan supplanting the former resident 
homes would produce a quite substantial amount of tax revenue for the city of New 
London. The intentions of the city are not consistent with the theory representing a 
government’s responsibility to its citizens.  New London did not have legitimate grounds 
to displace non-blighted residential homes and businesses with more fashionable 
structures to augment their financial status.  The cost incurred by the dwellers of Fort 
Trumbull exceeded the public gain garnered from the eminent domain acquisition.  The 
ruling may be deemed a public purpose by the U.S. Supreme Court, but it does not 
qualify as a public use.  The surplus present after the seizure should be reallocated among 
the citizens, in order to make everyone at least as well off as before the event.  This is not 
the case in the result decided in Kelo v. City of New London.  The existing surplus is 
attained by the city and the private development corporation  
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION: 
The sample examined in this study comes from a population of bonds included in 
the Bloomberg Professional financial database.  Specifically, the sample is described as 
bonds issued by municipalities for the purpose of economic improvement, public 
improvement, and industrial improvement.  The constraints imposed on the population to 
derive the sample are as follows: 
Bloomberg Search Criteria: 
1. The bond has to be issued by a municipality within the United States including 
Alaska and Hawaii 
2. The municipal bond has to be offered for the function of generating capital for 
economic improvement, public improvement, and industrial improvement 
3. The issue date of the municipal bond has to fall in the range of 06/28/1984 – 
01/01/2005 
4. The maturity date of the municipal bond has to fall in the range of 08/01/2008 – 
01/01/2027 
5. The selected municipal bonds are not bounded by coupon payment limits (0 - ∞) 
 
Table 3.1 illustrates the summary statistics regarding the selected municipal bonds and 
the classification allocation.   
         Table 3.1: Sample Description 
Variables Count Mean Std. Dev. Skewness     Range 
Number of Muni’s 4403 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Number of Muni’s (Economic 
Impt.) 
3064 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Number of Muni’s (Industrial Impt.) 922 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Number of Muni’s (Public Impt.) 417 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Issue Date n/a n/a n/a n/a 06/28/1984 - 
01/01/2005 
Maturity Date n/a n/a n/a n/a 08/01/2008 - 
01/01/2027 
Dummy Variable (Somin) = 0 3244 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Dummy Variable (Somin) = 1 1159 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
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Dummy Variable (CC) = 0 3210 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Dummy Variable (CC) = 1 1193 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
      
  Source: Bloomberg Professional 
  
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of types of municipal bonds (economic improvement, 
industrial improvement, and public improvement).  The percentage of economic 
improvement municipal bonds significantly outweighs the other two types.  The sample 
will be evaluated in the aggregate and by type. 
Figure 3.1: Municipal Bond Allocation 
 
The sample includes 42 of the 50 states.  Of the 42 states, the allocation of the 
number of municipal bonds in each one is depicted in Figure 3.2.  The top 5 states with 
the most observations in the sample are California, Illinois, Mississippi, Texas, and 
Georgia.  The states with the fewest observations are Alaska, Montana, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, and Tennessee.  The 8 states that are not included in this analysis are 
70%
9%
21%
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Hawaii, Idaho, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming, New Mexico, and New 
Hampshire. 
Figure 3.2: Frequency Distribution 
 
 The sample data obtained from Bloomberg Professional is time series municipal 
bond yields starting on 1/7/2005 and continuing weekly until 7/11/2008.  The yields are 
always reported on Fridays.  The current yields correspond to each municipal bond 
selected in the sample.  Statistics also gathered for each municipal bond CUSIP include, 
coupon payment rates, issue date, maturity date, state code, municipal purpose, and 
municipal region.  In addition to the data collected on municipal bonds, a dummy 
variable will be defined for the effectiveness of post-Kelo legislation corresponding to 
each state. 
 The entire sample will be divided into a treatment group and a control group.  The 
treatment group will consist of any municipal bond issued in a state categorized as 
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passing effective post-Kelo legislation.  The control group will consist of any municipal 
bond issued in a state classified as passing ineffective post-Kelo legislation.     
MUNICPAL BOND PURPOSES: 
This section expands on the reasons why municipal bonds are issued and what 
activities qualify as economic, industrial, and public improvements.  According to the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB), “municipal bonds are issued by states, 
counties, cities or their agencies to finance public-purpose projects … schools, roads, 
bridges, utilities, affordable housing, airports, hospitals, and other public facilities and 
programs.”37  In order to generate money for financing development activity, bonds are 
often issued by municipalities.  The three types of municipal bonds analyzed in this paper 
are believed to have the highest correlation with funding efforts for eminent domain 
takings.   
 Nearly all economic improvement bonds in the sample are issued for the purpose 
of funding redevelopment plans.  The redevelopment plans include projects such as 
updating dilapidated neighborhoods, modernizing downtown areas, and renewing 
merchant areas.  Table 3.2 shows a few examples of municipal bonds from different 
states offered with the intentions of economic improvement.  
 
Table 3.2:  Economic Improvement Municipal Bonds 
CUSIP: State: Purpose: 
34711GBH Colorado Police service building and deicing 
storage facility 
20772F6Y Connecticut General capital to the state of CT 
07201TXB California Funding Redevelopment Agencies 
551541AP Florida Lynn Haven Industrial Park 
                                                 
37
 Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, http://emma.msrb.org/EducationCenter/WhatAreBonds.aspx 
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199112CU Georgia Assorted Reason.  See reference in 
paragraph below 
   
 
The municipal bond issued by the city of Fort Collins, Colorado is for the purpose 
of building a police service building and a deicing storage facility.  The municipal bond’s 
official statement says, “The net proceeds of the certificates are to be used by the 
corporation to acquire from the city fee or leasehold interests in the site, to acquire, 
construct, and install the improvement on two parcels of the site…”38  This specific 
municipal bond offering may be used to build a public building, but the surplus is 
experienced by a corporation.  The municipal bond offered by California is for the 
purpose of funding redevelopment agencies, such as the Claremont Redevelopment 
Agency and the Redevelopment Agency of the City of Lakeport.  The corresponding 
official statement to the California CUSIP 07201TXB states: 
“All power of a redevelopment agency is vested in the members of its Board of 
Directors, which often is the City Council of the city in which the redevelopment 
agency was formed.  The redevelopment agency exercises governmental function 
in carrying out projects and has sufficiently broad authority to acquire, develop, 
administer and sell or lease property, including the right of eminent domain and 
the right to issue bonds or incur other types of indebtedness and to expend the 
proceeds.  A redevelopment agency can demolish buildings and other 
improvements and can own or acquire real property and develop the same.”39 
                                                 
38
 Official Statement, CUSIP: 34711GBH, http://emma.msrb.org/MS198370-1.pdf 
39
 Official Statement, CUSIP 07201TXB, http://emma.msrb.org/MS204070-1.pdf, pg. 4. 
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California is the heaviest user of eminent domain takings and most frequent state exposed 
in the municipal bond sample.  California is guilty of transferring eminent domain 
authority to private firms in order to carry out economic development takings.   
The municipal bond (551541AP) offered by Florida is for the redeveloping a city 
owned parcel of land to provide a 100,000 square foot manufacturing facility in Lynn 
Haven Commerce Park.40  The municipal bond issued by Georgia is for an assorted 
number of reasons including, refunding and redeeming a portion of the outstanding 
Columbus Building Authority Revenue Bonds, cost of acquiring land and or acquiring, 
installing, and developing certain facilities to be used for government, proprietary, and 
administrative functions, capitalized interest, and the cost of issuance of new revenue 
bonds.41  
Municipal bonds issued for the purpose of industrial improvement include 
projects such as purchasing office space, environmental activist movements, industrial 
training, and school renovations.  Table 3.3 shows a few examples of municipal bonds 
from different states offered with the intentions of industrial improvement.   
Table 3.3:  Industrial Improvement Municipal Bonds 
CUSIP: State: Purpose: 
130609AV California Acquisition of administrative offices 
and Clean Air Act 
394631AC North 
Carolina 
Redevelopment of land for International 
Paper 
010608XV Alabama Training for Hyundai and Mercedes 
manufacturing42 
455261UV Indiana Park Tudor School renovation43 
   
                                                 
40
 Official Statement, CUSIP 551541AP, http://emma.msrb.org/MS93763-1.pdf, pg. 6. 
41
 Official Statement, CUSIP 199112CU, http://emma.msrb.org/MS132070-1.pdf, pg. 7.  
42
 Official Statement, CUSIP 010608XV, http://emma.msrb.org/MS176569-1.pdf, pg. 4. 
43
 Official Statement, CUSIP 455261UV, http://emma.msrb.org/MS133950-1.pdf, pg. 3. 
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The municipal bond issued by California is for the purpose of acquiring a building in 
Sacramento to house administrative offices for the District and provide funding for a 
Clean Air Act.44  North Carolina issued CUSIP 394631AC to fund a redevelopment 
project to replace an old processing plant owned by the city with a new facility operated 
by International Paper.45  The transfer of property would generate more tax revenue for 
Green County, North Carolina.  The use of eminent domain is limited in the majority of 
the selected industrial improvement municipal bonds.   
 Municipal bonds issued for the purpose of public improvement include 
projects such as redevelopment plans, zoos, water treatment plants, sanitation, etc.  Table 
3.4 shows a few examples of municipal bonds from different states offered with the 
intentions of public improvement.   
Table 3.4:  Public Improvement Municipal Bonds 
CUSIP: State: Purpose: 
797300UZ California Horton Plaza Redevelopment46 
059189BF Maryland Assortment of Public Improvements47 
877223MC Michigan Land Acquisitions48 
68607VJU Oregon Schools and State Fair49 
   
 
The use of funding generated by the issuance of California’s CUSIP 797300UZ was to 
provide liquidity in the Horton Plaza redevelopment plan.  The capital was used to 
support the private agency’s development needs, including acquisition of property, 
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 Official Statement, CUSIP 130609AV, http://emma.msrb.org/MS164666-1.pdf, pg. 4. 
45
 Official Statement, CUSIP 394631AC, http://emma.msrb.org/MS171616-1.pdf, pg. 6. 
46
 Official Statement, CUSIP 797300UZ, http://emma.msrb.org/MS148676-1.pdf, pg. 6. 
47
 Official Statement, CUSIP 059189BF, http://emma.msrb.org/MS144443-1.pdf, pg. 9-10. 
48
 Official Statement, CUSIP 877223MC, http://emma.msrb.org/MS163479-1.pdf, pg. 4. 
49
 Official Statement, CUSIP 68607VJU, http://emma.msrb.org/MS182936-1.pdf, pg. 11. 
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demolishing of older buildings, and refinancing land.  Maryland’s municipal bond 
offering included redevelopment projects such as zoos, schools, libraries, office 
buildings, and sanitation.  Eminent domain takings are not present in the official 
statements for public improvement bond offerings except for California.   
 California is a regular user of establishing agencies to carry out economic 
development takings.  The power of authority is given to different agencies depending on 
the specific economic development objective the city has in mind.  The money needed to 
acquire the necessary property is obtained by offering municipal bonds.  California uses 
economic, industrial, and public improvement bonds to find financing for their projects.   
STATISTICAL MODELING: 
 The basic objective of the model is to describe the result of effective legislation 
on current bid yields of municipal bonds pertaining to economic improvement, industrial 
improvement, and public improvement.  In order to create an efficient method to capture 
the predicted outcome, a strategic model is constructed.  Through a difference-in-
difference test, municipal bond yields will be evaluated on several combinations of two 
static dates.  The first date (January 7, 2005) will be before the Kelo case was heard in the 
United States Supreme Court.  The second observed date will be several randomly 
selected dates after the Kelo decision until July 2008.  The analysis is suspended at this 
limit due to the financial crisis in the markets beginning the summer of 2008, caused by 
the subprime mortgage meltdown.  The difference-in-difference test at two distinct points 
in time controls for outside factors such as Federal Reserve monetary activity, inflation 
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adjustments, and international currents.  This practice ensures all tested municipal bonds 
have equivalent exposure to exogenous forces.   
The endogenous variable explored in the treatment is the difference between the 
municipal bond yield after the decision at one of the selected months and the 
predetermined date before the Kelo hearing.  The derivation of the dependent variable is 
as follows. 
Equation 1:  1 0i i iY y y∆ = −  
The term yi1 is each individual municipal bond’s yield at a selected date after the Kelo 
decision.  The term yi0 is each individual municipal bond’s yield at the fixed date before 
the initial Kelo hearing. 
One independent variable employed in the regression is a binary treatment 
variable specifying “1” for states with effective post-Kelo legislation and “0” for states 
with ineffective post-Kelo legislation.  Each individual CUSIP will be coded with a “0” 
or “1” depending on which type of legislation state the bond was issued.  The dummy 
variable representing reform effectiveness will take on two classification systems.  The 
study will be estimated using the Castle Coalition’s classification method and Ilya 
Somin’s categorization procedure.   
The Kelo dummy variable will be coded “0” starting on 01/07/2005 and continue 
for each date until the final decision was expressed on 06/23/2005.  Every date after the 
case was closed will receive a “1”.  The Kelo dummy variable intends to explain the 
financial effect experienced because of the Kelo decision. 
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The selected statistical model uses regression analysis to impose the dummy 
variable for legislature effectiveness, and the dummy variable representing the Kelo 
decision, on the difference variable.  The Ordinary Least Squares regression model 
exhibits the following functional form when applied to the present scenario: 
Equation2:  0 1 2* *
muni code kelo
i jt i iY DV DV Uβ β β∆ = + + +
  
The β0 coefficient determines the intercept term when all of the explanatory variables are 
coded “0”.    Parameter estimation explains the impact of the coefficient, β1 on the change 
in municipal bond yields over two specified dates.  The β1 term is known as the 
difference-in-difference estimator.  It can be manually calculated by taking the average 
yields of each classification of legislature strength at the two dates.  Equation 2 shows the 
computation method predicting the difference and difference coefficient.  
 
Equation 3:  ( ) ( )1 1 0 1 0After After Before BeforeYield Yield Yield Yieldβ  = − − − 
 
The term 1
AfterYield shows the average yields of all municipal bonds issued by a state with 
effective post-Kelo reform on a selected date after the Kelo decision.  The expression 
0
AfterYield explains the mean yields of all municipal bonds issued by a state with 
ineffective post-Kelo reform on a selected date after the Kelo decision.  The term 
1
BeforeYield shows the average yields of all municipal bonds issued by a state with effective 
post-Kelo reform on the chosen date, 01/07/2005.  The expression 0BeforeYield shows the 
average yields of all municipal bonds issued by a state with ineffective post-Kelo reform 
on the chosen date, 01/07/2005.   
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 The β2 coefficient shows the effect of the date Kelo was decided on the stream of 
municipal bond yields.  If the coefficient is positive, the dummy variable corresponding 
to the Kelo decision contributes the observed difference in municipal bond yields.  If the 
β2 term is negative, the Kelo dummy takes away from divergence in municipal bond 
yields.  The Ui term explains the error in the model not captured by the exogenous 
variables. 
The data will be initially tested using the entire sample of municipal bond yields.  
A difference-in-difference analysis for the complete sample will be evaluated annually in 
the month of July after the Kelo decision.  After the preliminary study, subsets of the 
sample will be observed to determine how much impact one category has on the 
aggregate outcome.  The municipal bonds will be separated based on the purpose of the 
issue.  The procedure will generate three subsets in the sample, economic improvement, 
industrial improvement, and public improvement.  Equation 4, 5, and 6 will estimate each 
of the subsets respectively, economic improvement, industrial improvement, and public 
improvement.   
Equation 4:
 
0 1 2* *
econ code kelo
ijt i iY DV DV Uβ β β∆ = + + +
 
 
Equation 5:
 
0 1 2* *
indus code kelo
ijt i iY DV DV Uβ β β∆ = + + +
 
 
Equation 6:
 
0 1 2* *
public code kelo
ijt i iY DV DV Uβ β β∆ = + + +
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HYPOTHEIS DECLARTION:  
The difference-in-difference estimator is the coefficient of interest in the research 
inquiry.  The study is attempting to provide insight on the financial effect on municipal 
bond yields caused by post-Kelo reform. I aim to show how substantial restrictions on the 
grasping hand of economic development takings permitted by eminent domain will lead 
to a significant change in municipal bond yields.  The formal hypothesis tested in the 
analysis is as follows: 
Test 1:     HO:  β1 = 0 
     HA:  β1 > 0 
 
The municipal bond yields for states that passed effective post-Kelo reform are expected 
to rise between the measurement dates because of the high cost involved in the 
acquisition of private property.  The increased protection of property rights will drive the 
price of the bond down and inversely cause the yield to go up.  The municipal bond 
yields for states that passed ineffective post-Kelo reform are projected to fall because the 
difficulty to seize property is very low.  The minimal cost to acquire land under 
ineffective reform inflates the price of the bond causing the yield to decrease.  A one-
sided test will be used to explain the difference in the β1 coefficient because the predicted 
result will be positive.  The null hypothesis states, there is no variation in municipal bond 
yields due to the type of state legislation passed after the Kelo decision.  If the null 
hypothesis is supported, the strength of reform passed has no explanation power of the 
fluctuations of municipal bond yields.  The alternate hypothesis provides the contrary to 
the null hypothesis.  If the alternate hypothesis is accepted, effective post-Kelo reform 
actually has a considerable influence on the observed changes in municipal bond yields.  
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This outcome would be the consequence of strong legislation restricting the use of 
eminent domain to acquire private property for private use.   
 The second hypothesis test includes the β2 coefficient representing the financial 
impact induced by the Kelo decision.  The formal hypothesis test for Kelo dummy 
variable is as follows: 
Test 2:     HO:  β2 = 0 
     HA:  β2 < 0 
 
The null hypothesis describes the condition where the Kelo outcome has no influence on 
municipal bond yields.  The alternate hypothesis explains the scenario where the Kelo 
result decreases the municipal bond yield.  If the analysis rejects the null hypothesis in 
favor of the alternate, the predicted result is confirmed.  Since the Kelo decision does not 
offer any further restrictions on municipalities performing eminent domain takings, the 
yields should decrease.  The price of the bond will rise because private property is easier 
to take and inversely the yield will diminish.  The predicted effect will be a negative sign 
on the β2 coefficient.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
ENTIRE SAMPLE ANALYSIS: 
 The summary statistics describing the differences on each observed date is offered 
in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
Variables: Mean: Std. Dev.: Skewness: Range: 
Diff. 07/01/2005 0.0003 0.071 -0.844 (-0.423) – (0.416) 
Diff. 07/07/2006 0.1928 0.113 2.228 (-0.140) –( 1.332) 
Diff. 07/06/2007 0.1798 0.151 3.702 (-0.332) –( 2.052) 
Diff. 07/04/2008 0.1443 0.181 5.114 (-0.353) –( 2.707) 
 
    
Source: Bloomberg Professional 
 
The results obtained by following the preceding methodology are presented using the 
Castle Coalition’s classification method and Somin’s classification system for the entire 
sample.  Figure 4.1 graphically depicts the total sample by displaying the yield before on 
the y-axis and the yield after on the x-axis.   
Figure 4.1:  Before and After Comparison 
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The yields of states that failed to pass legislation after the Kelo decision do not deviate 
away from an imaginary 45 degree line.  The yields of states that passed ineffective 
legislature tend to show a slight divergence of before and after yields.  As predicted, the 
yields of effective states are apt to be higher after substantial reform has been enacted 
than before the legislation.   
 The STATA results will start at the first month prior to the Kelo decision and 
report annually until the last accounted date of the sample, July 4, 2008.  Appendix A and 
B show the statistical output for the Castle Coalition’s classification system and Somin’s 
classification system respectively, derived by regressing the dummy variable for 
legislature effectiveness, and the dummy variable representing the Kelo decision on the 
independent variable.  Each coefficient in the analysis is listed in table 4.2 below and the 
standard error is in parenthesis.   
Table 4.2: Entire Sample Regression Output 
Difference Variable: β1: Diff-in-Diff Β2: DV_Kelo 
07/01/2005: CC 0.016 
(0.002) 
-0.047 
(0.015) 
07/01/2005: Somin 0.015 
(0.002) 
-0.047 
(0.015) 
07/07/2006: CC 0.012 
(0.003) 
-0.058 
(0.024) 
07/07/2006: Somin 0.010 
(0.003) 
-0.057 
(0.024) 
07/06/2007: CC 0.021 
(0.005) 
-0.089 
(0.033) 
07/06/2007: Somin 0.019 
(0.005) 
-0.088 
(0.033) 
07/04/2008: CC 0.025 
(0.006) 
-0.120 
(0.039) 
07/04/2008: Somin 0.024 
(0.006) 
-0.119 
(0.039) 
   
 
 42
 
 Regardless the classification system applied to the model and at all relevant points 
in time, the difference-in-difference estimator is significant at the 99% confidence 
interval.  The coefficients range from a maximum of 0.025 to a minimum of 0.012.  The 
difference-in-difference estimator explains how much of the observed difference in 
municipal bond yields at two points is accounted for by effective state legislature.  
According to the findings, effective post-Kelo reform contributes up to a 0.025 
percentage points in the total variation over time.  The adjustment due to legislation with 
strength may seem small, but when describing yields on municipal bonds, a 0.025 
percentage change is economically meaningful.   
 The dummy variable representing the time at which the Kelo decision was 
confirmed shows a negative coefficient.  The Kelo binary variable shows the effect of the 
high court’s decision on municipal bond yields.  According to the results, the Kelo 
decision is consistent with the predicted results, that Kelo should decrease the yields.  
This occurrence is due to the confirmation of weak property right protection by the 
Supreme Court.  The court’s decision allows municipalities to acquire land at a low 
marginal cost which inflates the bond’s price.   
  The entire model built on the explanatory variables; dummy variable for 
legislature effectiveness and the dummy variable representing the Kelo decision only 
capture a minor portion of the total difference in municipal bond yields.  This occurrence 
is reflected in relatively low adjusted R-squared.  The error term Ui retains most of the 
residual significance not described by the model.  Even though a low adjusted R-squared 
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is present, the objective of the analysis, discover the effects of effective post-Kelo reform, 
was accomplished. 
ANALYSIS OF SAMPLE SUBSETS: 
 An investigation of three subsets within the sample will be tested to determine if 
any one factor is responsible for driving the results in the entire model.  The three subsets 
examined pertain to the purpose or reason why the municipality issued the bond.  The 
divisions are economic improvement, industrial improvement, and public improvement.  
Appendix C shows the results of the regression analysis for municipal bonds offered for 
the purpose of economic improvement.  Appendix D shows the results of the regression 
analysis for municipal bonds offered for the purpose of industrial improvement.  
Appendix E shows the results of the regression analysis for municipal bonds offered for 
the purpose of public improvement.  Table 4.3 shows the regression coefficients for each 
subset. Each coefficient in the analysis is listed below and the standard error is in 
parenthesis.   
Table 4.3: Subset Regression Output 
Difference Variable: β1: Diff-in-Diff Β2: DV_Kelo 
07/07/2006: CC: Econ Imprv. 0.026 
(0.004) 
-0.068 
(0.021) 
07/07/2006: Somin: Econ Imprv. 0.025 
(0.004) 
-0.068 
(0.021) 
07/04/2008: CC: Econ Imprv. 0.041 
(0.005) 
-0.142 
(0.028) 
07/04/2008: Somin: Econ Imprv. 0.041 
(0.005) 
-0.142 
(0.028) 
07/07/2006: CC: Ind Imprv. -0.036 
(0.106) 
0.110 
(0.034) 
07/07/2006: Somin: Ind Imprv. -0.036 
(0.010) 
0.110 
(0.034) 
07/04/2008: CC: Ind Imprv. -0.033 
(0.020) 
0.126 
(0.066) 
07/04/2008: Somin: Ind Imprv. -0.033 0.126 
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(0.020) (0.066) 
07/07/2006: CC: Pub Imprv. 0.000 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.021) 
07/07/2006: Somin: Pub Imprv. -0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.021) 
07/04/2008: CC: Pub Imprv. -0.031 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.028) 
07/04/2008: Somin: Pub Imprv. -0.044 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.027) 
   
 
The estimation of all three subsets enlightens the driving force behind the 
coefficient of interest.  The difference-in-difference estimator for municipal bonds issued 
for the purpose of economic improvement explains more than 0.04 percentage points of 
the change in yields over the time series.  The coefficient standing for state legislature 
effectiveness for economic improvement inundates the state legislature effectiveness 
coefficients regarding industrial and public improvements.     
 The dummy variable representing the time at which the Kelo outcome became 
public information displays results almost consistent with the entire sample.  Municipal 
bonds offered for the purpose of economic improvement displays negative coefficients.  
The coefficients for industrial improvements and public improvements are positive, but 
they are insignificant.   
HYPOTHESIS RULING: 
 Based on the analysis, the null hypothesis for test 1, there is no variation in 
municipal bond yields due to the type of state legislation passed after the Kelo decision, 
is rejected at a 0.01 level of significance.  The alternate hypothesis, there is a positive 
change in municipal bond yields due to the strength of state legislation passed after Kelo, 
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is confirmed by the results in the study.  States that passed effective statutes post-Kelo 
actually make a difference in the yields realized by investors of municipal bonds.   Strong 
restrictions against eminent domain takings make it harder for municipalities to take 
private property, which decreases the price of a municipal bond.  Inversely a decrease in 
the price of a municipal bond will lead to increase in the yield.   
 Hypothesis test 2 offers results that confirm the predicted outcome of the impact 
of the Kelo decision on municipal bond yields.   The negative coefficient on β2 provides 
insight on the increased incentive of municipalities to perform takings because the 
Supreme Court was not willing to set a meaningful restriction.  The less cost involved in 
the takings process, the more willing municipalities are to perform takings, and the higher 
the price of municipal bonds.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
DISCUSSION 
 Epstein brings up the question, “What minimum of additional power must be 
added for the state to become more than a voluntary protective association and to acquire 
the exclusive use of force with its territory?”50   His concise answer summarizes all 
literature dealing with eminent domain and government intervention with one response, 
“the only additional power needed is the state’s right to force exchanges of property 
rights that leave individuals with rights more valuable than those they have been deprive 
of.”51  He goes on to express the limitations of eminent domain that are necessary for the 
state to be in compliance with its regulatory duties to its citizens.  The state may utilize 
eminent domain for only the reason of public use, negating any private-to-private 
transfers.  Also each citizens affected by eminent domain takings must receive an 
efficient outcome through just compensation.   
 The U.S. Supreme Court has deviated away from the intended meaning of the 
takings clause in the Fifth Amendment.  By neglecting to enforce restrictions on the 
power of the state, the legal system has failed to protect individual’s private property 
rights.  The federal judicial deference to the state’s reasoning ability is a complete failure 
to the entire property rights system.  Allowing states to determine the necessary 
allocation of property will almost always result in inefficient outcomes.  Kelo is a prime 
example of eminent domain abuse by the state and it demonstrates an inefficient 
allocation of rights.  The city of New London completely disregarded every constitutional 
                                                 
50
 Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1985, pg. 332 
51
 Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 1985, pg. 332 
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constraint on the state and initiated a redevelopment plan promoting a one-sided gain.  
The true cost was placed on the displaced residents of Fort Trumbull and the “public 
benefit” was redistributed among developers, corporations, and government entities.  
This outcome is not consistent with the actual purpose of the state.  The explanation is 
bolstered by the negative coefficient of β2 found in the study.  The Kelo result offered by 
the high court provides no additional protection of private property rights.  The case gives 
municipalities more incentive to transfer private property for private gain because the 
Supreme Court makes it easier to get away with takings.   
 Effective state legislation induced by Kelo has been a hopeful step in the right 
direction for the protection of individual’s property rights.  Ineffective state reform 
containing loopholes such as broad definitions of blight and limited areas still eligible for 
takings has not contributed any meaningful reassurance to the problem at hand.  Only 
legislation with strength against unjust takings deserves merit.   
 The purpose of the study was to supplement the existing literature pertaining to 
eminent domain by using a novel approach.  Yields on municipal bonds issued for the 
reasons of economic improvement, industrial improvement, and public improvement 
were analyzed to expand on the consequences of effective vs. ineffective post-Kelo 
reform.  The research inquiry started with an investigation of the reasons why a state 
would be inclined to seize a citizen’s private property and transfer the rights of ownership 
to another private party.  The gain realized by the breach of duties by the state would 
have to exceed the loss incurred from public distrust.  New London was faced with the 
moral decision, to maintain social equilibrium and continue to protect the rights of its 
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taxpaying citizens or deviate away from its obligation and pursue selfish endeavors at the 
cost of its citizens.  The potential gains, in the form of tax revenue to the state from the 
transfer of wealth, surpassed the state’s social commitment to be an advocate of 
individual’s property rights.   
 After establishing government motives to act unconstitutionally, a further 
examination about funding ensued.  In order to pay fair market value or “just 
compensation” to each person forced to surrender their rights, capital has to be generated.  
Municipalities issue bonds with a specific purpose in mind to create liquidity.  The 
capital raised by debt instruments is used to justly compensate individuals for 
relinquishing their property for economic development.  Municipal bonds offered by 
financially stable cities are presumed to be sound investments with the potential for solid 
growth and low probability of default.  Municipal bonds offered by financially unsteady 
cities possess the characteristics of being risky investments and having questionable 
growth estimates.  A bond issued by a municipality within a state that diligently protects 
the property rights of its citizen, should have a higher return over the term compared to a 
bond offered by a municipality within a state that fails to pass effective eminent domain 
legislation.  In order to entice prospective investors, weak legislation states offer high 
coupon payments to offset the low returns.  The average coupon payment for ineffective 
eminent domain legislation states is 4.76 and the average coupon payment for states 
passing effective post-Kelo reform is 4.67.   
 Kelo left its unpleasant impression on the legal system as well as every property 
owner throughout the United States.  The analysis of municipal bond yields in the study 
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offers further insight on the consequences Kelo prompted.  The results discovered in the 
model supports the importance of valuable eminent domain legislation.  Effective state 
legislation explains up to 0.02 percentage points of the difference in municipal bond 
yields observed after Kelo.  States enacting strong post-Kelo reform are commended for 
their efforts to maintain social order, promote equality among citizens, and fulfill the 
obligations of the state.  These states should serve as models of social efficiency and 
judicial reverence for states continuing to practice unconstitutionally.   
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Appendix A 
Castle Coalition Classification: 
07/01/2005:  
 
 
07/07/2006: 
 
 
07/06/2007: 
 
 
07/04/2008: 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0428571    .015573     2.75   0.006     .0123263     .073388
     dv_kelo     -.047754   .0156242    -3.06   0.002    -.0783852   -.0171228
 dv_class_CC      .016098    .002422     6.65   0.000     .0113497    .0208463
                                                                              
diff07012005        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    22.6728893  4402  .005150588           Root MSE      =  .07136
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0112
    Residual    22.4085834  4400   .00509286           R-squared     =  0.0117
       Model    .264305888     2  .132152944           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,  4400) =   25.95
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4403
                                                                              
       _cons      .247381    .024676    10.03   0.000     .1990035    .2957584
     dv_kelo     -.058142   .0247571    -2.35   0.019    -.1066785   -.0096056
 dv_class_CC     .0123269   .0038377     3.21   0.001      .004803    .0198507
                                                                              
diff07072006        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    56.4575878  4402   .01282544           Root MSE      =  .11308
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0030
    Residual    56.2629317  4400   .01278703           R-squared     =  0.0034
       Model    .194656031     2  .097328015           Prob > F      =  0.0005
                                                       F(  2,  4400) =    7.61
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4403
                                                                              
       _cons     .2629524    .032946     7.98   0.000     .1983617     .327543
     dv_kelo    -.0894842   .0330543    -2.71   0.007    -.1542872   -.0246812
 dv_class_CC     .0219451   .0051239     4.28   0.000     .0118997    .0319905
                                                                              
diff07062007        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    100.858132  4402  .022911888           Root MSE      =  .15098
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0051
    Residual    100.294263  4400  .022794151           R-squared     =  0.0056
       Model    .563868473     2  .281934236           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,  4400) =   12.37
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4403
                                                                              
       _cons     .2573333   .0395558     6.51   0.000     .1797841    .3348825
     dv_kelo    -.1204958   .0396858    -3.04   0.002    -.1982999   -.0426916
 dv_class_CC     .0257676   .0061519     4.19   0.000     .0137068    .0378284
                                                                              
diff07042008        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    145.420041  4402  .033034994           Root MSE      =  .18127
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0054
    Residual    144.574434  4400  .032857826           R-squared     =  0.0058
       Model    .845607735     2  .422803868           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,  4400) =   12.87
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4403
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Appendix B 
Somin Classification: 
07/01/2005: 
 
 
07/07/2006: 
 
07/06/2007: 
 
 
07/04/2008: 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0428571   .0155819     2.75   0.006     .0123087    .0734056
     dv_kelo    -.0474138   .0156326    -3.03   0.002    -.0780616    -.016766
  dv_class_S      .015284   .0024457     6.25   0.000     .0104893    .0200787
                                                                              
diff07012005        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    22.6728893  4402  .005150588           Root MSE      =  .07141
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0101
    Residual    22.4344419  4400  .005098737           R-squared     =  0.0105
       Model    .238447406     2  .119223703           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,  4400) =   23.38
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4403
                                                                              
       _cons      .247381   .0246829    10.02   0.000       .19899    .2957719
     dv_kelo    -.0576586   .0247632    -2.33   0.020    -.1062069   -.0091103
  dv_class_S      .010861   .0038741     2.80   0.005     .0032658    .0184561
                                                                              
diff07072006        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    56.4575878  4402   .01282544           Root MSE      =  .11311
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0024
    Residual    56.2943009  4400  .012794159           R-squared     =  0.0029
       Model    .163286859     2  .081643429           Prob > F      =  0.0017
                                                       F(  2,  4400) =    6.38
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4403
                                                                              
       _cons     .2629524   .0329594     7.98   0.000     .1983354    .3275694
     dv_kelo    -.0887631   .0330666    -2.68   0.007    -.1535903    -.023936
  dv_class_S     .0198625   .0051731     3.84   0.000     .0097206    .0300044
                                                                              
diff07062007        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    100.858132  4402  .022911888           Root MSE      =  .15104
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0043
    Residual    100.376069  4400  .022812743           R-squared     =  0.0048
       Model    .482062321     2   .24103116           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,  4400) =   10.57
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4403
                                                                              
       _cons     .2573333   .0395641     6.50   0.000     .1797679    .3348988
     dv_kelo    -.1199865   .0396927    -3.02   0.003    -.1978042   -.0421687
  dv_class_S     .0245979   .0062098     3.96   0.000     .0124236    .0367722
                                                                              
diff07042008        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    145.420041  4402  .033034994           Root MSE      =  .18131
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0049
    Residual    144.635113  4400  .032871617           R-squared     =  0.0054
       Model     .78492799     2  .392463995           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,  4400) =   11.94
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    4403
 53
Appendix C 
Economic Improvement: 
 
Castle Coalition : 07/07/2006 
 
 
Somin : 07/07/2006 
 
Castle Coalition : 07/04/2008 
 
 
Somin : 07/04/2008 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons      .247381   .0210621    11.75   0.000     .2060836    .2886783
     dv_kelo    -.0686618   .0211557    -3.25   0.001    -.1101427   -.0271809
 dv_class_CC     .0265389   .0041872     6.34   0.000     .0183289    .0347488
                                                                              
diff07072006        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    28.9720639  3063  .009458721           Root MSE      =  .09652
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0151
    Residual    28.5158903  3061  .009315874           R-squared     =  0.0157
       Model    .456173632     2  .228086816           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,  3061) =   24.48
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3064
                                                                              
       _cons      .247381   .0210715    11.74   0.000     .2060652    .2886967
     dv_kelo    -.0683243   .0211642    -3.23   0.001    -.1098218   -.0268267
  dv_class_S     .0259493   .0042428     6.12   0.000     .0176304    .0342683
                                                                              
diff07072006        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    28.9720639  3063  .009458721           Root MSE      =  .09656
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0142
    Residual    28.5413342  3061  .009324186           R-squared     =  0.0149
       Model    .430729712     2  .215364856           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,  3061) =   23.10
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3064
                                                                              
       _cons     .2573333   .0283527     9.08   0.000      .201741    .3129256
     dv_kelo    -.1427262   .0284787    -5.01   0.000    -.1985656   -.0868868
 dv_class_CC     .0417238   .0056366     7.40   0.000      .030672    .0527756
                                                                              
diff07042008        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    52.9697015  3063  .017293406           Root MSE      =  .12993
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0238
    Residual    51.6739846  3061  .016881406           R-squared     =  0.0245
       Model    1.29571686     2   .64785843           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,  3061) =   38.38
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3064
                                                                              
       _cons     .2573333   .0283584     9.07   0.000       .20173    .3129367
     dv_kelo    -.1424106   .0284831    -5.00   0.000    -.1982586   -.0865626
  dv_class_S     .0417857     .00571     7.32   0.000       .03059    .0529815
                                                                              
diff07042008        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    52.9697015  3063  .017293406           Root MSE      =  .12995
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0234
    Residual     51.694577  3061  .016888134           R-squared     =  0.0241
       Model    1.27512443     2  .637562214           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,  3061) =   37.75
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3064
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Appendix D 
Industrial Improvement: 
 
Castle Coalition: 07/07/2006 
 
 
Somin: 07/07/2006 
 
 
Castle Coalition: 07/04/2008 
 
Somin: 07/04/2008 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .1162857   .0342403     3.40   0.001     .0490873    .1834841
     dv_kelo     .1102825   .0348973     3.16   0.002     .0417947    .1787704
 dv_class_CC    -.0360068   .0106863    -3.37   0.001    -.0569792   -.0150344
                                                                              
dif~07072006        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    23.0699938   920   .02507608           Root MSE      =  .15691
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0182
    Residual    22.6015113   918  .024620383           R-squared     =  0.0203
       Model     .46848253     2  .234241265           Prob > F      =  0.0001
                                                       F(  2,   918) =    9.51
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     921
                                                                              
       _cons     .1162857   .0342346     3.40   0.001     .0490985    .1834729
     dv_kelo      .110373    .034888     3.16   0.002     .0419036    .1788424
  dv_class_S    -.0365404      .0107    -3.41   0.001    -.0575397   -.0155411
                                                                              
dif~07072006        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    23.0699938   920   .02507608           Root MSE      =  .15688
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0185
    Residual    22.5939977   918  .024612198           R-squared     =  0.0206
       Model      .4759961     2   .23799805           Prob > F      =  0.0001
                                                       F(  2,   918) =    9.67
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     921
                                                                              
       _cons     .0886667     .06495     1.37   0.173     -.038801    .2161343
     dv_kelo     .1269533   .0661963     1.92   0.055    -.0029603    .2568669
 dv_class_CC    -.0333853   .0202707    -1.65   0.100    -.0731676     .006397
                                                                              
dif~07042008        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    81.8296857   920  .088945311           Root MSE      =  .29764
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0040
    Residual    81.3242208   918  .088588476           R-squared     =  0.0062
       Model    .505464928     2  .252732464           Prob > F      =  0.0582
                                                       F(  2,   918) =    2.85
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     921
                                                                              
       _cons     .0886667   .0649501     1.37   0.173    -.0388013    .2161347
     dv_kelo     .1268489   .0661897     1.92   0.056    -.0030517    .2567495
  dv_class_S    -.0334029   .0203001    -1.65   0.100     -.073243    .0064371
                                                                              
dif~07042008        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    81.8296857   920  .088945311           Root MSE      =  .29764
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0040
    Residual    81.3246624   918  .088588957           R-squared     =  0.0062
       Model    .505023313     2  .252511657           Prob > F      =  0.0583
                                                       F(  2,   918) =    2.85
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     921
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Appendix E 
Public Improvement: 
 
Castle Coalition: 07/07/2006 
 
 
Somin: 07/07/2006 
 
 
Castle Coalition: 07/04/2008 
 
 
Somin: 07/04/2008 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .2175714    .020851    10.43   0.000     .1765841    .2585587
     dv_kelo    -.0061561   .0217159    -0.28   0.777    -.0488435    .0365313
 dv_class_CC     .0005166    .009946     0.05   0.959    -.0190345    .0200678
                                                                              
dif~07072006        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3.77144252   415  .009087813           Root MSE      =  .09555
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0046
    Residual    3.77070867   413  .009130045           R-squared     =  0.0002
       Model    .000733844     2  .000366922           Prob > F      =  0.9606
                                                       F(  2,   413) =    0.04
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     416
                                                                              
       _cons     .2175714   .0208245    10.45   0.000     .1766364    .2585064
     dv_kelo    -.0034499    .021665    -0.16   0.874    -.0460371    .0391374
  dv_class_S    -.0066393    .010015    -0.66   0.508     -.026326    .0130474
                                                                              
dif~07072006        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3.77492593   416  .009074341           Root MSE      =  .09543
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0036
    Residual    3.77024957   414  .009106883           R-squared     =  0.0012
       Model    .004676362     2  .002338181           Prob > F      =  0.7737
                                                       F(  2,   414) =    0.26
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     417
                                                                              
       _cons     .1794286   .0270638     6.63   0.000     .1262286    .2326286
     dv_kelo    -.0030173   .0281864    -0.11   0.915     -.058424    .0523894
 dv_class_CC    -.0317582   .0129096    -2.46   0.014    -.0571349   -.0063815
                                                                              
dif~07042008        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    6.45001756   415  .015542211           Root MSE      =  .12402
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0103
    Residual    6.35254253   413  .015381459           R-squared     =  0.0151
       Model    .097475026     2  .048737513           Prob > F      =  0.0431
                                                       F(  2,   413) =    3.17
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     416
                                                                              
       _cons     .1794286    .026863     6.68   0.000     .1266238    .2322334
     dv_kelo     .0007754   .0279472     0.03   0.978    -.0541608    .0557115
  dv_class_S    -.0444663   .0129191    -3.44   0.001    -.0698615   -.0190712
                                                                              
dif~07042008        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    6.45780304   416  .015523565           Root MSE      =   .1231
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0238
    Residual    6.27375587   414     .015154           R-squared     =  0.0285
       Model    .184047169     2  .092023585           Prob > F      =  0.0025
                                                       F(  2,   414) =    6.07
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     417
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